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THE FEDERAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
ITS ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, PRESENT STATUS AND TREND
While the concept of search and seizure has
frequently been the object of scholarly in-
quiry,' the courts and legal writers have failed
to afford the law enforcement officer and the
private individual a predictable basis for the
resolution of the troublesome conflict occasioned
by the use of this detective device. The Federal
law presently is in a state of confusion and flux
as a result of the Supreme Court's tendency to
treat each case upon its facts without supplying
workable standards.2 The situation is further
complicated by the judicial reluctance to
recognize that the right of search and seizure
is not inherently abusive, but is primarily a
device for the detection and punishment of
crime. As such, it enables law officers to take
into custody property either unlawfully ob-
tained or retained, and to discover and seize
articles which constitute or contain instrumen-
talities of crime. It is only the abuse of this
right which creates problems and which is
subject to the judicial and constitutional sanc-
tions of the Fourth Amendment.3
I See Trimble, Search and Seizure under the
Fourth Amendment as Interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court, 41 Ky. L. J. 196 (1953):
Reynard, Freedom From Unreasonable Search and
Seizure, 25 IND. L. J. 259 (1950).
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950);
Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931).
2 "The rights of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
Ts FouRrH AM NDmENT, SEARcH WAmAm,
AND ExCmusiowARY RuLE
The Fourth Amendment secures every citizen
in his person, premises, papers, and effects
from search and seizure which is unreasonable
because it is not authorized by law or in accord-
ance with a proper search warrant. The Amend-
ment contemplates that a person shall be secure
until he is lawfully disturbed by a search war-
rant issued upon prayer to the judgment of a
disinterested and impartial magistrate.4 Con-
sequently, while legality of the search and
seizure depends upon its reasonableness this in
turn frequently revolves around the presence
or absence of a proper search warrant.5 What
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CoNsT.
AmEND. IV.
4 Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914); Boyd
v. United States 116 U. S. 616 (1886).
5However, the mere presence of a search warrant
is not always determinative of legality. Thus, a
search and seizure pursuant to a valid warrant may
be rendered unreasonable by the conduct of the law
officers. Further, the absence of a search warrant
does not necessarily render a seizure illegal. Searches
without a warrant when made contemporaneously
with a valid arrest have been sustained; Harris v.
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constitutes a valid search warrant is in itself a
complex problem. The basic prerequisite is
that a search warrant must conform strictly to
the constitutional and statutory provisions for
its issuance. A warrant is authorized where (a)
there is a showing of probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation, and (b) the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized
are particularly described.
6
The restrictions imposed upon the issuance
of search warrants and the tendency of the
courts to construe the Fourth Amendment
liberally have operated to check the intruding
law enforcement officer. However, this constitu-
tional protection was not self-executing because
at common law the admissibility of evidence
was not affected by the illegality of the means
by which it was obtained! As a result federal
courts would not permit collateral inquiry into
the source of competent evidence.8 In Weeks v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); or upon a show-
ing of probable cause when it is not feasible to ob-
tain a search warrant, Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carrol v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925). In Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10 at 14 (1948) other "exceptional circum-
stances" recognized were: flight of a suspect, situa-
tions involving a moving vehicle, or where evidence
or contraband is threatened with removal or destruc-
tion.
6 U.S. CoNsT. AmEND. IV.; See also Grau v.
United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932); Byars v.
United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927). These requisites
were said to prevent the issuance of warrants on
loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact, and to
emphasize the purpose to protect against all general
searches .... Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282
U.S. 344 at 357 (1931).
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928);
Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
8 In Adams v. New York, supra note 8, the
refusal to consider the source of illegally seized
evidence was held not violative of the Fourth
Amendment. The case of Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886) was distinguished for there the
defendants raised objections to the unreasonable
seizure at the very time it was proposed to be
attempted-viz., when the Government moved for
a court order compelling the production of the
incriminating evidence.
United States,9 however, the Court created an
exception by ruling that the subsequent use of
this evidence was precluded upon defendant's
seasonable application for the return of the
things illegally seized or upon motion to sup-
press. 0 The efficacy of this exclusionary rule
lies in the assumption that if evidence illegally
seized cannot be used at trial the overly zealous
law officer will be less prone to violate the sus-
pect's constitutional rights. The relative success
of this judicial protection of the constitutional
right of privacy may vary with the individual
view taken as to the Fourth Amendment's
position in the struggle against modern crime 1
The exclusionary rule is limited in scope. First,
within the federal sphere it operates to protect
against encroachments upon privacy by the
Government and neither the rule nor the
Fourth Amendment is concerned with intrusions
by private individuals."' Second, the Fourth
9 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
10 For various procedural justifications of this rule
see 37 MnaN. L. Rxv. 188 (1953); also see Mr.
justice Black's concurrence in Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 at 39 (1949) in which he indicated that
the federal exclusionary rule was not a constitu-
tional command but a judicially created rule of
evidence.
n1 Another alternate remedy available is the
private tort action against the offending officer. The
reluctance of innocent victims to bring suit and the
usual financial irresponsibility of police officers
render this a remedy of doubtful value. Further, the
remedy of criminal prosecution of the offending
officer appears even less effective. For a famous
criticism of the exclusionary rule itself see Judge
Cardozo's opinion in People v. Defoe, 242 N.Y. 13,
150 N. E. 585 (1926). The exclusionary rule has
never been a completely acceptable remedy, and it
might be wiser to give less attention to evaluation -
and place more emphasis upon the education and
training of competent and moral law enforcement
officers.
2 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921)
Evidence illegally seized by state officials is ad-
missible in federal courts so long as the unreason-
able search and seizure was not participated in by
federal officers. United States v. Haywood, 208 F.
2d 156 (1953); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28
(1927); but cf. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74
(1949).
[tCol. 45
CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
Amendment, while enforceable against the
states through the Due Process Clause," does
not necessarily command that the exclusionary
rule be adopted by the states in vindication of
that constitutional right.' 4 Third, before the
rule can be invoked there must be seasonable
assertion by a defendant who can show that his
constitutional rights have been invaded by the
unreasonable seizure; i.e., the immunity is said
to be personal18
UNAsooNr FEDERAL SRARcH Ai SEizuRE
Since, in the absence of "exceptional circum-
stances" or "necessity, 6 a search is basically
unreasonable without a warrant,-the pertinent
questions which arise are: (1) whether a search
and seizure pursuant to a search warrant can
ever be unreasonable; and (2) whether it can
ever be reasonable without a search warrant.
Seizure of Articles having evidentiary value
only-In Boyd v. United States7 a statutory sub-
poena duces tecumwould not issue to compel pro-
duction of certain privatepapers incriminativeto
the defendant in a forfeiture trial. Such a process
was declared to be an unreasonable search and
seizureviolative of the Fourth Amendment and a
legal compulsion inconsistent with the self-
crimination protection of the Fifth Amend-
ment 8 This decision clearly indicated that a
13 U.S. CONST. AmEND. XIV; Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949); cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937); Irvine v. People, 47 Sup. Ct. 381
(1954); People v. Rochin, 342 U.S. 165 (1951)
4 An appendix to Wolf v. Colorado, supra note
13 at 33 includes a listing of the states accepting and
rejecting the exclusionary rule.
15 Kelley v. United States, 61 F.2d 843 (8th Cir.,
1932) These procedural limitations upon the ex-
clusionary rule will be treated in a subsequent
section.
16 See note 5 supra.
17 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Is U.S. CoNsT. AmEND. V. The Self-Crimination
protection of the Fifth Amendment is not available
to corporations. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
But for corporate experience with the Fourth
Amendment see Oklahoma Press Publishing Com-
pany v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Federal
Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264
U.S. 298 (1924); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)
peaceful seizure through statutory subpoena of
private papers may be as unreasonable as a
violent and forceful search and seizure. However,
would those private papers have been subject
to seizure under a valid search warrant. In
Gouled v. United States 9 this question was
answered in the negative! A search warrant
could not issue solely for the purpose of securing
evidence to establish proof of the commission of
an offense.
Because the Court in both Boyd and Gouled
necessarily was forced to acknowledge that
there were certain things subject to seizure
under a search warrant there arose a distinction
which indicates the standard presently in con-
sideration: i.e., seizure of property which has
evidentiary value only is prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment whereas seizure would be
proper if for some reason the Government or
public has a paramount interest in the desired
articles. A seizure of private articles or papers
such as contracts, memoranda, letters, in-
voices etc., solely for their use as evidence in a
subsequent criminal trial would fall within the
former prohibited classification. Articles gener-
ally classified as public would include stolen
goods, contraband, instrumentalities of crime,
and articles seized to prevent further frauds.0
The distinction applies whether or not there is a
warrant.
This standard indicates that illegality of a
seizure, with or without a warrant, usually is
dependent on the nature of the article seized.
However, if each case is to be decided on its
particular facts the courts would experience
- 225 U.S. 298 (1921). This was also a holding
that search and seizure by stealth and subterfuge
is unreasonable; cf. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S.
313 (1921).
20 See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452
(1932); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). How-
ever, seizure of these articles without a search war-
rant is still unreasonable unless other justifications
are present. Amos v. United States, supra, Note 19;
Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States,
251 U.S. 385 (1920). Compare these cases with
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1947) where
a subpoena would properly issue to compel produc-
tion of public records.
19541
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little difficulty in avoiding this standard by
characterizing otherwise private papers as
"public", or by finding that the seized articles
are includible in the aforementioned classifica-
tion of things subject to seizure. A pertinent
example of this reasoning can be found in Zap
v. United States2' where federal agents, while
legally inspecting the accounts of a government
contractor (defendant), discovered and seized a
cancelled check which exposed a fraud upon the
Government. Zap's subsequent conviction was
upheld notwithstanding the absence of a
search warrant and despite the private nature
of the check. Seizure was justified because (1)
the search being legal the agents might have
testified as to what they saw,2 and (2) a valid
warrant could have issued for the seizure of this
check.P
If a valid search warrant could not authorize
seizure of a contract and fee bill in Gouled it is
difficult to discern why in Zap seizure of a
cancelled check without a warrant can be more
justifiable merely by designating it an instru-
ment used in the commission of a crime, or by
stating its seizure was necessary to prevent
further frauds. The CourtinZap did notconsider
the applicability of Gouled, nevertheless that
decision must be viewed as severely restricted
by the Zap case unless the special circumstances
afford a basis for distinction.
Thus, while the "nature of the article" test
has lost much of its earlier force, the Supreme
Court frequently relies upon it to buttress a
doubtful holding. This is true particularly, as
will be indicated subsequently, where search
and seizure is justifiable as incident to a lawful
arrest.24
21328 U.S. 624 (1946)
22 See notes 36 and 38, infra dealing with wire-
tapping.
23Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 at 629
(1946).
24 Recent cases in the "incidental arrest" field
bear upon the problem of the nature of the articles
seized. In all the recent Supreme Court cases where
seizure was held valid the articles were such as to
invest the Government or the public with a para-
mount right to possession. Frequently, it was stated
that the mere possession of certain articles con-
stituted a "continuing offense" committed in the
General Exploratory Search: Seizure of Goods
Not Described in the Warrant-The constitu-
tion requirement that a search warrant par-
ticularly describe the things to be seized enables
the courts to test the reasonableness of a
search and seizure by two further standards:
first, if a search is general and exploratory in
nature there is a tendency to invalidate the
seizure; second, a seizure of goods of one
description cannot be justified under a search
warrant authorizing the seizure of goods of
another description.
With respect to the first point the Fourth
Amendment is liberally construed to protect
against the ransacking or general rummaging
of personal and business effects. This would be,
true whether or not a search warrant is present.
In both United States v. Lefkowoitz25 and Go-Bart
Co. v. United States26 a search and seizure pur-
suant to a lawful arrest was condemned as
unreasonable because of the general and ex-
ploratory nature of the search. These decisions
were a result of the failure of the arresting
officers to be specific in their search, and be-
cause any and all articles were seized which
would have incriminating evidentiary value-at a
future criminal trial. Accordingly, the constitu-
tional limitation of definiteness applies with
equal force in search and seizure incidental to a
valid arrest.
This problem of definiteness is accentuated in
cases where goods of one description are seized
under a search warrant authorizing seizure of
goods of another description. In the execution of
search warrants, law officers are authorized to
presence of the arresting officers, or emphasis was
placed upon the "public" character of the articles
seized. See Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56,
(1950) (forged overprints of stamps); Davis v'.
United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946) (unlawful
possession of gasoline ration coupons); Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (illegal pos-
session of draft cards); but cf. McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948).
26United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452
(1932).
26 Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344
(1931).
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seize only the articles therein described. In
Marron v. United States,2" a seizure of a ledger
and certain bills was improper because not
particularly described in a valid warrant
authorizing seizure of illicit liquor and equip-
ment. Although this seizure was not authorized
by a warrant, it was nevertheless justified as
incidental to the lawful arrest. By such justifica-
tion the Court opened an avenue for avoiding
the very limitation it sought to impose upon
the seizure power. Harris v. United Statesss
illustrates this point. Defendant was validly
arrested in his apartment for mail fraud.
Pursuant to a search for forged checks and
certain equipment federal officers discovered
and seized draft cards illegally possessed by
defendant. The seizure was upheld because of
the valid arrest and because possession of the
draft cards was a continuing crime committed
in the presence of the officers. The apparent
question which arises is whether if a search
warrant had issued for seizure of the forged
checks could the draft cards have been legally
seized? The Marron ddcision indicates a nega-
tive answer; yet illegality is avoided by the
valid arrest. But is it solely the valid arrest
which determines the outcome or did the
Court in the Harris case also buttress its deci-
sion upon the nature of the articles seized? That
is, the Harris case emphasized the character of
the documents as government property, the
possession of which constituted a continuing
offense. Similarly, in Marron, the articles seized
were deemed instruments of crime and were
part of a continuous offense against the Gov-
ernment.2* The dissenters in Harris argue that
because of such decision the legality of a search
is now to be determined on what is turned up,
27 275 U.S. 192 (1927)
28 331 U.S. 145 (1947)
29 See also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56 (1950); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582
(1946). There is some authority for the seizure of
articles of contraband not specified in a search
warrant if they are of the same general nature as
those specifically described. See United States v.
Old Dominion Warehouse, 10 F.2d 736, 739 (2d Cir.
1926); cf. Paper v. United States, 53 F.2d. 184 (4th
Cir. 1931); United States v. Camarota, 278 F. 388
(S.D.Cal. 1922).
and as a consequence the way is open for a
revival of the general search warrant.30 How-
ever, this danger may be over-emphasized; if
one believes that the constitutional protection
is satisfied once the officers are legally upon the
premises and are conducting a specific search
pursuant to a warrant or valid arrest. Should
the law officer be required to ignore contraband
or instrumentalities and fruits of crime which
may come into sight? The Court intimates
that the answer must depend upon the peculiar
facts of each seizure.
Indirect and Derivative Use of Illegally Seized
Evidence-The trend of Supreme Court deci-
sions is to amplify the exclusionary rule by
precluding any indirect or derivative use of
evidence clearly unreasonably seized. In Silver-
thorne Lumber Co. v. United Slates.' offices of a
corporation were entered without a search
warrant and all records were seized. A motion
to return the property was granted. Thereafter
the Government had subpoenas issued requiring
the corporation to produce the originals of the
returned documents for use at the trial. In
reversing a contempt conviction for refusal to
comply, the Supreme Court held that the
Government could not make indirect use of this
evidence originally illegally obtained. The
constitutional protection demanded not merely
that evidence so acquired shall not be used
directly before the court, but also that it could
not be brought before the court by only indirect
means.u However, facts once illegally gained
could still be proved by other independent
sources.P
30 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 at 155
(1947); cf. United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581
(1948).
31251 U.S. 385 (1920).
32 Id. at 392; In United States v. Wallace &
Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 796 (1949) this holding
was explicitly approved.
3
3This dictum was followed in United States v.
Krulewitch, 167 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1948); rev'd on
other grounds, 336 U.S. 440 (1949) (Discretionary
with trial judge to accept prosecutor's assurances
that certain evidence could have been procured
wholly by investigation unconnected with the
illegal search); Warren v. Territory of Hawaii, 119
F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1941) (Knowledge of facts gained
1954]
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The most logical extension of the Silverthorne
rule precluded the use of illegal evidence to
obtain other evidence derivatively. In the
Gouled case the Court refused to admit into
evidence a duplicate of a contract, the original
of which had been illegally seized. Silverthorne
was strong authority for the Court's recognition
of defendant's reasoning that illegal possession
of the original must have suggested the exis-
tence and obtaining of the counterpart.
3 4
This same reasoning was apparent in Nardone
v. United States35 which involved use of evidence
obtained through wire-tapping. 6 The Federal
Communications Act3 rendered wire-tapping
illegal and on this basis evidence obtained by
such illegal means was held inadmissible. In
addition, the Court struck down any derivative
use of such illegal evidence, stating that the
defendant should be given opportunity to prove
that a substantial portion of the case against
him was "a fruit of a poisonous tree".35
Another branch of the Silverthorne rule is
that witnesses may not testify as to what they
saw during an illegal search. 9
by a proper independent source may be used though
it also may be obtained from an illegal act).
mGouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 307
(1920).
- 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
16 In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928) it was held that the Fourth Amendment was
not violated by the mere tapping of telephone
wires of the premises of an accused. The theory was
that there was neither a search nor a seizure when
the sense of hearing was involved, and where there
was no entry of the houses or offices of defendant.
'48 STAT.1103 (1934) 47 U.S.C. §605 (1946).
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 at 341
(1939). Subsequent wire-tapping cases dealing with
the derivative evidence problem are Weiss v.
United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939) (Evidence ob-
tained from wire taps could not be used to induce
some of the defendants to testify against other
defendants who were the senders of the com-
munication); and Goldstein v. United States, 316
U.S. 114 (1942) (approving the Silverthorne rule but
permitting indirect use of illegal evidence because
the intercepted telephone communications were
not communications to which the defendant was a
party).
3 Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921)
Problems which remain under the Silverthorne
rule can only be alluded to at this point. They
are: (1) whether a subsequent search warrant
could reach articles which were previously
illegally obtained; 0 (2) whether illegally seized
evidence can be the basis of a subsequent
arrest.41
Search and Seizure Incidence to an Arrest-
The most patent example of a reasonable
search and seizure without a search warrant is
seen in the "incidental arrest" cases. It is in
(Testimony of officers unlawfully upon the premises
inadmissible); Nueslein v. Distrct of Columbia,
115 F.2d 690 (D. C. Cir. 1940); but cf. Zap v.
United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946) where officers
were lawfully upon the premises and consequently
could testify to what they saw.
40 See Parts Mfg. Corporation v. Lynch, 129 F.
2d 841 (2d Cir. 1942), cert denied, 317 U.S. 674 (1942)
w'here a valid search warrant did issue for the
seizure of machinery once illegally obtained. How-
ever, the affidavits supporting the warrant revealed
that the Government had subsequently received its
information legally and independently. But cf.
Fraternal Order of Eagles, No. 778 v. United States,
57 F.2d 93 (3rd Cir. 1932); United States v. Plisco,
22 F. Supp. 242 (D.D.C. 1938); United States v.
Mitchneck, 2 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Pa. 1933)
41 For an exhaustive analysis of this particular
problem and the Silverlhorne rule see Heald and
Tyler Jr., The Legal Principles Behind the Ameorasia
Case, 39 GEo. L. J. 181 (1951). J6hnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); and Taylor v. United
States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) are authority for the
principle that probable cause for an arrest im-
mediately after an illegal search cannot be based on
evidence discovered during that search. Also, an
arrest based on evidence illegally seized cannot
make that evidence admissible as a seizure incident
to arrest. See also Somers v. United States, 138 F.
2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943)
42 See Note 5 supra. Another reasonable limita-
tion on the necessity of a warrant pertains to searches
of vehicles and other means of transportation.
Where the search is for contraband and other illegal
articles, and there is probable cause to believe that
the vehicle which is stopped contains such goods,
seizure is justified because of the impracticality of
obtaining a warrant before the vehicle leaves the
jurisdiction. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 16
(1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1924). As to what constitutes probable cause see
[Vol. 45
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this field that the flux in the law is most ap-
parent. Although it is true that a search and
seizure without a warrant contemporaneous
with a valid arrest may be reasonable, the ap-
plicability of this exception and the extent to
which it may be carried are constant problems.
Accordingly, an historical approach is proper to
portray the shifting' trends in the Supreme
Court decisions and to describe the nature of
this exception and its relation to the standards
previously indicated.
The reasonableness of search and seizure
incidental to arrest depends upon the nature
of the crime, the physical area and extent of
search, and the character of articles seized.
Aside from the essential fact that the arrest
be lawful, the consequent search and seizure
must be physically, and not merely chrono-
logically, coincidental with the arrest. Thus,
in the Weeks case a search and seizure of
defendant's home could not be justified by a
simultaneous lawful arrest of defendant in his
business offices. In Agnello v. United States and
Silvertlhorne a lack of physical proximity was
also determinative of illegality. However, the
Weeks and Agnello opinions indicated in dicta
that in a proper arrest case not only the person
but also the home was subject to search and
seizure without a warrant.
This dicta became a clear holding in the
1927 Marron decision where a search of premises
and seizure of certain bills and a ledger found in a
closet were held proper as an incident to a
lawful arrest. The Court emphasized that
a crime was being committed at the time of
arrest, and that the articles seized were things
used to commit the offense.
The Marrot holding was somewhat shaken
by the subsequent Go-Bart and Lefkowitz
Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932); Husty
v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931). See also,
Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) on
the issue of good faith. For search on the high seas
see United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927) and
Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927). That
a search and seizure may be made without a warrant
in open fields and woods see Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)
- 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
decisions where valid arrests could not justify
improperly conducted searches and seizures.
It was clear that the Court shifted toward a
liberal application of the constitutional protec-
tion by condemning the respective searches as
general and rummaging. Matron was distin-
guished because there the "things were visible
and accessible and in the offender's immediate
custody"."
With Marron, Go-Bart, and Lefkowitz as
working precedent in the field of incidental
arrest, the Court entered the post-World War
II period with the following propositions: (1)
a search -and seizure incident to a valid arrest
was a limited exception and would not be proper
if general, exploratory or rummaging; (2) a
seizure would be more justifiable if the articles
were in plain view, or in the immediate custody
of the arrestee; and (3) the risk of unreason-
ableness would be less if the articles seized
were instrumentalities of crime, or of such a
nature that the mere possession of such would
constitute a crime or continuing offense.
Davis v. United States,45 decided in 1946, was
the first major case to test these propositions.
Federal agents received gasoline from defendant
without presenting the requisite ration coupons.
Defendant was arrested and after repeated
demands he consented to unlocking his offices,
whereupon the agents entered and seized certain
gasoline coupons pursuant to a search. Mere
possession of these coupons was illegal and the
subsequent decision in favor of the law officers
was consistent with proposition three. The
Court went even further and pointed out that
the ration coupons were not private but public
in the sense that they remained at all times
the property of the Government subject to
inspection and recall. This extended the test
4Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344,
358 (1931). The ledger and bills in the Matron case
were found in a closet. Were they really "visible
and accessible"?
45 328 U.S. 582 (1946)
46 The mere fact that defendant assented to a
search was not a waiver of his constitutional protec-
tion. See Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313
(1921); cf. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948)
1954]
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based upon the nature of the articles seized.
Since the agents knew specifically what they
were searching for the Court avoided any con-
tention that the search was exploratory.
Clearly, this decision liberalized the "visible
and accessible" test since it was necessary for
the agents to demand entrance into defendant's
offices. The coupons were in defendant's
immediate custody but whether this is a pos-
sible justification is doubtful. Objectively, the
case had to be regarded as a set-back to the con-
stitutional protection.
The reasoning in Davis was reflected again
in the Harris decision and Rabinowitz v. United
States.47 In Harris, defendant was lawfully
atrrested in his rooms. Pursuant to a search for
certain forged checks a sealed envelope was
seized containing draft cards the possession of
which was illegal. The search and seizure was
held reasonable as incident to a lawful arrest.
The result was aided by the reasoning that
possession of the draft cards was a continuing
crime committed in the presence of the officers.
This was the theory rejected in Go-Bart and
Lefkowitz and which basically was analogous
to the Davis reasoning. The decision was a
strong holding in favor of law enforcement for
clearly evidence seized in a sealed envelope
was not "in plain view".4 But in Harris, as
in the David and Marron cases, the character
of the seized articles was the controlling factor.
The Rabinowitz decision in 1950 was the
apex of the Marron doctrine which had found
new life in David and Harris. Nevertheless,
between this decision and the Harris case.the
Court had backtracked to its previous liberal
view. In Johnson v. United States,49 Trupiano
v. United States,'0 and McDonald v. United
States,5' despite clear violations of law the
Court slapped the hands of the law enforce-
- 339 U.S. 56 (1950)
48 If a search warrant had issued for the forged
checks there is doubt whether seizure of the draft
cards would have been authorized. See Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
o 333 U.S. 10 (1948)
50 334 U.S. 699 (1948)
51335 U.S. 451 (1948). For a similar liberal hold-
ing see United States v. Dire, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
ment officials by holding illegal the respective
searches and seizures because the law officers
had sufficient time, opportunity, and informa-
tion to procure a search warrant before the
arrest was made.
This so-called "opportunity" theory was
rendered comparatively unimportant by its
clear rejection in Rabinowitz. There, after weeks
of federal surveillance, defendant was arrested
at his place of business. Without a warrant,
desks, cabinets, and a safe was searched, and a
quantity of forged cancelled stamps were seized.
This search and seizure was held reasonable as
incidental to a valid arrest. The Court em-
phasized that the officers were searching for
specific objects so as to avoid any objection
that the search was exploratory. In support of
their holdings, the Court also pointed out
that defendant's office was a public place to
which the public, including the agents, were
invited, that the office was small and within
the immediate and complete control of the
defendant, that the search did not extend
beyond the room used for unlawful purposes,
and finally that possession of the forged over-
prints was a crime.
The enumeration of these special circum-
stances was an implied indication that search
and seizure incident to a valid arrest was basi-
cally a limited right. Since the reasonableness
of every search and seizure is now to rest upon
ad hoc determinations, the Rabinowitz case
offers a convenient stopping point for an objec-
tive view of the arrest cases and their relation
to the general law.52 Despite shifts in opinion
and personnel of the Court the following
tendencies remained from the original post-war
propositions:
"A case subsequent to Rabinowitz is McKnight
v. United States, 183 F. 2d 977 (D. C. Cir. 1950)
where without a warrant federal agents broke
down a door to a private dwelling and arrested
defendant and incidentally seized certain incriminat-
ing equipment. In rejecting a prior convenient
opportunity to arrest defendant and by breaking
down the door the action of the officers was declared
unreasonable. This decision illustrates that the
liberality of the Rabnouitz holding may be avoided
where the particular circumstances are such as to
enablethecourttobrand the seizure as unreasonable.
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(1) Search and seizure contemporaneously
with an arrest is an exception to the constitu-
tional requirement of a warrant and is strictly a
limited right. The basic purposes are (a) to
protect the arresting officer and to deprive the
prisioner of means of escape, (b) to avoid
destruction of evidence by the arrestee, and (c)
to gather instruments of the crime.
(2) The search and seizure must be proximate
to the arrest in time and physical area. The
seized articles must either be in plain view, in
the immediate custody of the arrestee, or
reasonably accessible without exploring, rum-
maging or ransacking. Thus, the conduct of the
arresting officers is frequently very important.
Where they proceed orderly, and where specific-
ity is the mark of the search the risk of im-
propriety is lessened. However, the limits of
permissible search have never been fully
defined although there is a working test of
reasonableness for each situation.
(3) The nature of the crime and the character
of the seized articles usually controls the disposi-
tion of a particular case. Consequently, where
the crime is of a continuing nature which is
aggravated by possession of contraband or
articles the mere possession of which is an
offense, there is a tendency to uphold the seiz-
ure. Further, seizure of papers or articles,
which are public in nature or which are invested
with a paramount public interest, is more likely
to be justifiable than seizure of private papers.
In this connection it will be remembered that
there is judicial antipathy towards seizure of
articles solely for their evidentiary value.
(4) Finally, although constitutional protec-
tion extends to both private and public prem-
ises, there is a tendency to protect a private
dwelling more than a business or public place."
PROCEDURAL L=IrATmONs UpoN THE FEDERAL
EXCLUSIONARY R=LE
The scope of the exclusionary rule has been
sharply constricted by the procedural limita-
13 Compare Rabinowitz v. United States, 339
U.S. 56 (1950) with McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451 (1948) and Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10 (1948).
tions imposed upon its invocation.M4 The victim
of a violation of the constitutional immunity
is personally aggrieved and only he has a right
to complain.,' Consequently, requisite standing
to raise the constitutional issue of unreasonably
seized evidence is the first main limitation. The
second is that constitutional issues must be
asserted seasonably or they will not be consid-
ered at trial or upon appellate reviewA
Interest in Properly Searched and/or Property
Seized-Where the defendant does not claim
ownership either of the premises searched
or the property seized he is in no position to
resist the admissibility of seized evidence.
There is conflict, however, as to whether in-
terests in both the premises (property) searched
and the property seized are necessary requisites
for standing. Although there are indications
that both interests are necessary,- there is a
tendency to sustain a standing if either interest
is present.0
Where interest is the premises searched is the
basis for standing the federal courts have
"This topic is too broad to be exhaustively
treated in this comment. For collateral reading see
Edwards, Seasonable Protests Against Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures, 37 MuN L. REv. 188 (1953);
Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized
Evidence, 47 Nw. L. REv. 471 (1952).
"5 Kelley v. United States, 61 F.2d 843 (8th Circ.
1932).
56The federal exclusionary rule does not bar
evidence illegally sized by persons other than
federal law enforcement agencies. This is not
basically a procedural limitation but actually a
substantive limitation. Cases are cited at note 12
supra.
0 Casey v. United States, 191 F. 2d 1 (9th Cir.
1951); Rev'd on other grounds, 343 U.S. 808 (1952);
Lewis v. United States, 92 F.2d 952 (10th Cir.
1937).
rIngram v. United States, 113 F.2d 966 (9th
Cir. 1940); Brown v. United States, 61 F.2d 363
(8th Cir. 1932); Occinto v. United States, 54 F.2d
351 (8th Cir. 1931).
"United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951);
Gibson v. United States, 149 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir.
1945); Matthews v. Correa, 135 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.
1943); Pielow v. United States, 8 F.2d'492 (9th
Cir. 1925). See cases collected in notes 285 and 287
to U.S.C.A. Const. amend. IV.
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either demanded ownership or possession, the
latter being necessary in cases involving les-
sors, 60 the former being requisite where an
employee6' seeks standing. Thus, the anomaly
is that both the lessor who has title, but no
possession and the employee who has no title,
but who may be in possession are denied
standing.n If security and privacy in one's
premises or property is the major constitutional
objective it would appear that possession should
be controlling.
In view of the numerous cases in which the
courts attempt to distinguish between owner-
ship and possession when concerned with the
premises searched, it is difficult to reconcile
holdings where standing is recognized solely
upon an interest in the property seized. In
United States v. Jeffers,63 the Supreme Court
negated the distinction between elements of
60 Schnitzer v. United States, 77 F.2d. 333 (8th
Cir. 1935); United States v. Muscarelle, 63 F.2d
806 (2d Cir. 1933) (cases where standing has been
denied to lessors out of possession.) The lessee,
however, can challenge the legality of a search and
seizure conducted upon the leased premises. United
States v. DeVasto, 52 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1931);
cf. Coon v. United States, 36 F.2d 164 (10th Cir.
1929) (lessee can object only as to that part of the
premises over which his lease extends).
61 An employee cannot complain of an illegal
search and seizure of the employer's property. Often
the employee is convicted by incriminating evidence
in his possession without ever having the oppor-
tunity to challenge their illegal seizure. United
States v. Conoscente, 63 F.2d. 811 (2d Cir. 1933);
Kelley v. United States, 61 F.2d 843 (8th Cir.
1932); but cf. Alvau v. United States, 33 F.2d 467
(9th Cir. 1929).
62 As to standing of corporations and corporate
officers see United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co.,
155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946); In Re Dovley, 48
F.2d 121(2d Cir. 1931); Guckenheimer v. United
States, 3 F.2d 786 (3rd Cir. 1925) cert. denied, 268
U.S. 688 (1925) For standing of conspirators see
United States v. DeVasto, 52 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.
1931) and for co-defendants Ingram v. United
States, 113 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1940); but cf. United
States v. Thompson, 113 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1940).
1 342 U.S. 48 (1941); for a similar holding see
Pielow v. United States, 8 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1925).
search and elements of seizure and dearly held
that, notwithstanding a lack of possession or
ownership interest in the premises unlawfully
searched, the defendant's mere defeasible prop-
erty right in the contraband seized was sufficient
to give him standing. This was a liberal holding
and must be viewed as a deviation from the
earlier strict insistence on a personal violation
of defendant's privacy and security. Con-
sequently, when the Supreme Court allows
standing in a situation where an illegal search
as to one person is combined with an illegal
seizure as to another a wedge in this procedural
limitation on the exclusionary rule is now
present.
Seasonable Objection to Unreasonably Seized
Evidence--A motion to suppress evidence ob-
tained by unreasonable search and seizure
must be timely asserted1A This requirement is
an outgrowth of the common law rule which
precludes collateral inquiry into the source of
competent evidence and from the judicial
reluctance to consider a constitutional issue
unless seasonably raised. A timely assertion
is interpreted to mean pre-trial.65
Exceptions to this basic rule frequently arise
when a motion to suppress is made'during the
trial because the defendant is unaware of the
illegal seizure. In such case the violation of the
constitutional immunity must be dear and un-
doubted.66 Also, where the unconstitutionality
of the seizure becomes apparent during the
offending officer's testimony a subsequent sup-
pressing motion is upheld.Y7 Absent exceptional
circumstances, most federal courts narrowly
64Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914);
see FED. R. Cp-,. P. 41(e).
61 Segurola v. United States, 275 U.S. 106 (1947);
United States v. Wernecke, 138 F.2d 561 (7th Cir.
1943); cert. denied, 321 U.S. 77f (1944).
66 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925);
Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921);
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
67 Amos v. United States, supra note 66; These
exceptions are recognized in Fz. R. Caw. P.
41 (e), 18 U.S.C. §687 et. seq. (1947), 57 STAT-767
(1943).
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